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COMMANDER AIR FORCE
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION, NORTH ISLAND
SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA

IN REPLY REFER TO

FF411 A25

SERIAL NO:

804 19684

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH PART VIII OPNAVINST 3750.6B

6 DEC 1956

THIRD ENDORSEMENT on VF-51 AAR ser 4-56 concerning FJ-3M BUNO 136146
accident occurring 29 October 1956, pilot SCHMOOK

From: Commander Air Force, Pacific Fleet
To: Chief of Naval Operations (OP-57)
Via: Director, U. S. Naval Aviation Safety Center
Subj: VF-51 AAR ser 4-56

1. Redressed and forwarded, concurring in the conclusions and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board.

(b) (6)



By direction

Copy to:
BUAER (Aer-512)
NAVAIRAPCEN (2)(airmail)
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CVG-5
CO, VF-51

ORIGINAL,

CCVG-5/AW/rd8

A25

Seri 309-56

15 November 1956

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on VF-51 All Seri 4-56 FJ-3M 136146, Accident
Occurring 24 October 1956, Pilot 5640 K

From: Commander, Carrier Air Group FIVE
To: Chief of Naval Operations (Op-57)
Via: (1) Commander Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet
 (2) Chief, Bureau of Aeronautics (AER 512)
 (3) Director, U. S. Naval Aviation Safety Center

Subj: Aircraft Accident Report

1. Forwarded, concurring with the first endorsement.
2. The following errors were noted: The copies of this report received by this command were not marked Special Handling in accordance with Part VII OPNAVINST 3750.6B. Local corrective action was taken on available copies.

Ralph M. Bagwell
Ralph M. BAGWELL

Copy to:
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CO, VF-51

ORIGINAL

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH
PART VII
OPNAVINST 3750.6B

ORIGINAL

FVF-51/WER/bjm

A25

Ser 620

9 November 1956

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on VF-51 AAR 4-56 concerning FJ-3M BuNo. 136146
accident on 29 October 1956, pilot SCHMOOK

From: Commanding Officer, Fighter Squadron FIFTY-ONE
To: Chief of Naval Operations (OP-57)
Via: (1) Commander, Carrier Air Group FIVE
(2) Commander Air Force, Pacific Fleet
(3) Chief, Bureau of Aeronautics (AER-512)
(4) Director, U.S. Naval Aviation Safety Center

Subj: Aircraft Accident Report

- ✓ 1. Forwarded concurring with the conclusions and recommendations
of the Aircraft Accident Board.

VRACIU

Copy to:
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SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH
PART VII
OPNAVINST 3750.6B

3

ORIGINAL

See Instructions for completion
prior to filling out

PART I - GENERAL

SECTION A - IDENTIFICATION	1. AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT BOARD CONVENED BY:				DATE OF ACCIDENT	TIME	AMM. SERIAL NUMBER			
	Fighter Squadron FIFTY-ONE				29 Oct 1956	07230	4-56			
	4. TO:				6. ENCLOSURES: (1) Statement of witness					
	CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (Op-57)				(2) Statement of witness					
	6. VIA: (1) Commander, Carrier Air Group FIVE				(3) Statement of wheels watch					
	(2) Commander Air Force, Pacific Fleet				(4) Statement of I.S.O.					
	(3) Chief Bureau of Aeronautics (Bu-Air-51C)				(5) Statement of Asst'l I.S.C.					
	(4) Naval Aviation Safety Center				(6) Photographs (9)					
	(5) [REDACTED]				(7) Cockpit diagram					
	(6) [REDACTED]				(8) Local Flight Plan (11ND form 2391)					
(LAST) DIRECTOR, U.S. NAVAL AVIATION SAFETY CENTER				(9) See Remarks						
7. REPORTING CUSTODIAN (IF DIFFERENT THAN LIAISON NUMBER):				8. ACTIVITY OPERATING AIRCRAFT (IF DIFFERENT FROM LINE 7)						
9. KIND OF FLIGHT		10. TIME OF DAY		11. LOCATION OF ACCIDENT		12. ELEVATION ABOVE SEA LEVEL				
145		<input type="checkbox"/> DAWN	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DAY	<input type="checkbox"/> DUSK	<input type="checkbox"/> NIGHT	NAS Miramar				
13. PLACE OF LAST TAKE-OFF				14. CLEARED FROM		15. Elevation above sea level				
NAS Miramar				NAS Miramar		475				
16. TYPE OF CLEARANCE:		<input type="checkbox"/> IFR	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> VFR	<input type="checkbox"/> LOCAL	<input type="checkbox"/> OPERATIONAL	<input type="checkbox"/> AIRWAYS	<input type="checkbox"/> DIRECT	<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER (Specify)		
17. TIME IN FLIGHT		18. TYPE ACCIDENT		19. PHASE OF FLIGHT		20. AIRCRAFT				
04:00		D-1 Spin Landing Configuration		7 Landing Approach		FJ-3M				
21. MODEL		22. SERIAL NUMBER		23. DAMAGE TO AIRCRAFT		24. DOLLAR COST	25. AIRSPEED (KTS)	26. A/C WEIGHT		
FJ-3M		136146		<input type="checkbox"/> A <input type="checkbox"/> B <input type="checkbox"/> C <input type="checkbox"/> D		384,000	115	16,350		
27. LIST MODEL, SER. NRS., REPORTING CUSTODIAN AND DAMAGE CLASSIFICATION OF ANY OTHER A/C INVOLVED (Complete separate OPNAV Form 3750-1 for each A/C)										
SECTION B - PERSONNEL INFORMATION	28. PERSONNEL		29. NAME (last, first and middle initials)		30. RANK/RATE	31. FILE/SERVICE NO.	32. DESIGNATOR	33. DATE DESIGNATED	34. DATE OF BIRTH	35. AGE
	PILOT (Person in control at time of accident)		SCHROOK, Charles E.		ENG	(b) (6)	1325	3/17/66	(b) (6)	22
	CO-PILOT									
	36. PERSONNEL		37. OPERATIONAL FLIGHT TRAINER		38. UNIT TO WHICH ATTACHED				39. TYPE INSTRUMENT CARD	
	PILOT		<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	Fighter Squadron FIFTY-ONE				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> STANDARD	<input type="checkbox"/> SPECIAL
CO-PILOT		<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO	<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO					<input type="checkbox"/> STANDARD	<input type="checkbox"/> SPECIAL	
SECTION B - PILOT, CO-PILOT, STUDENT EXPERIENCE	40. ITEM		PILOT	CO-PILOT	STUDENT	41. ITEM		PILOT	CO-PILOT	STUDENT
	42. ALL MODELS		510.8			43. LANDINGS DAY/NIGHT		6/0		
	ALL MODELS IN LAST 12 MONTHS		254.4			44. CLP LANDINGS DAY/NIGHT		91/0		
	ALL MODELS IN LAST 3 MONTHS		99.0			45. INSTRUMENT HOURS, LAST 3 MONTHS		17.5		
	ALL SERIES THIS MODEL		130.9			46. NIGHT HOURS, LAST 3 MONTHS		4.3		
	ALL SERIES THIS MODEL, LAST 12 MONTHS		130.9			47. (jet accidents only) TOTAL JET PILOT HOURS		252.9		
	ALL SERIES THIS MODEL, LAST 3 MONTHS		80.2			48. DATE LAST FLIGHT, ALL SERIES THIS MODEL		10/28/56		
						49. DURATION LAST FLIGHT, ALL SERIES THIS MODEL		1.5		
50. ALL PERSONNEL		NAME (last, first and middle initials)	RANK/RATE	FILE/SERVICE NO.	ORG. TO WHICH ATTACHED	INJURY CODE	BILLET	POSITION		
1. SCHROOK, Charles E.		ENG	(b) (6)	FIGHTER FIVE-ONE	A	Pilot	Cockpit			
2. MOORE, William E.		YN3		FIGHTER ONE TWO TWO	A	SA	Auto			
3. CALDWELL, Noel V.		SN		FIGHTER ONE TWO TWO	A	NA	Auto			

(If additional space is necessary, attach additional sheet(s))

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT

OPNAV REPORT 3750-1

1. CEILING	2. VISIBILITY	3. WIND DIRECTION AND VELOCITY	4. TEMPERATURE	5. OUTSIDE AIR WIND	6. DEW POINT	7. ALTIMETER SETTING
1000'	10	2000' GUSTS	53°F	N/A	49°F	30.01

8. OTHER WEATHER CONDITIONS (WIND SHIFT, TURBULENCE, STATE OF SEA, ETC., IF PERTINENT TO ACCIDENT)

ITEM	P	S	ITEM	P	S	ITEM	P	S
PILOT ERROR			LANDING SIGNAL OFFICER ERROR			MATERIAL FAILURE OR MALFUNCTION		
CREW ERROR			OTHER PERSONNEL ERROR, Specify.....			MATERIAL INADEQUACY		
SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL ERROR			ADMINISTRATIVE ERROR			ROLLING AND PITCHING DECK/ROUGH SEAS		
Maintenance PERSONNEL ERROR			AIRPORT OR CARRIER FACILITIES			UNDETERMINED		
SERVICING PERSONNEL ERROR			WEATHER			OTHER, Specify.....		

FOR ACCIDENTS ABOARD DEPLOYED CARRIERS (Complete Following Section on Page 3)

1. DATE DEPLOYED	2. DAY - HOURS/LANDINGS LOGGED SINCE DEPLOYED	3. DAY - HOURS/LANDINGS LOGGED LAST 30 DAYS
4. INSTRUMENT HRS. LOGGED SINCE DEPLOYMENT	5. NIGHT - HOURS/LANDINGS LOGGED SINCE DEPLOYED	6. NIGHT - HOURS/LANDINGS LOGGED LAST 30 DAYS

PART II - MAINTENANCE, MATERIAL AND FACILITIES DATA

1. AIRCRAFT HISTORY	DATE OF MANUFACTURE	SERVICE TOUR	MONTHS IS THIS TOUR	TOTAL NO. OF OVERHAULS	FLIGHT HRS SINCE LAST OVERHAUL	FLIGHT HRS SINCE ACCEPTANCE	TYPE CHECK LAST PERFORMED	FLIGHT HRS SINCE LAST CHECK	NO. OF DAYS SINCE LAST CHECK
	20 Dec 55	1	10	0	358.2	358.2	2nd Int.	23.3	13
		ENGINE MODEL	SERIAL NO. OF ENGINE						
2. ENGINE HISTORY	10. 22 Sep 55 J65WAB	16510745	1	64.9	67.3	2nd Int.	23.3	13	
NO. 1									
NO. 2									
NO. 3									
NO. 4									

a. DID FIRE OCCUR: BEFORE ACCIDENT AFTER ACCIDENT DID NOT OCCUR b. DID EXPLOSION OCCUR IN FLIGHT? YES NO

c. CHECK IF APPLICABLE d. HAS DIR BEEN REQUESTED? e. FAILED COMPONENTS INVOLVED
 AMP FOR SERIAL YES NO

CHECK BELOW ITEMS PRESENT IN THIS ACCIDENT

a. <input type="checkbox"/> AIRCRAFT DESIGN	d. <input type="checkbox"/> UNDETERMINED	g. <input type="checkbox"/> SURFACE FACILITIES
b. <input type="checkbox"/> AIRCRAFT EQUIPMENT	e. <input type="checkbox"/> TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION	h. <input type="checkbox"/> HUMAN ENGINEERING (e.g. cockpit configurations)
c. <input type="checkbox"/> MAINTENANCE	f. <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER, Specify.....	

i. ALTITUDE AT MALFUNCTION j. AIR SPEED (KTS) k. OPERATING TEMPERATURE l. WEIGHT OF AIRCRAFT m. G/S IN MAC n. KIND OF FUEL o. FUEL PRESSURE

p. EVIDENCE OF FUEL CONTAMINATION q. CAUSE OF ENGINE FAILURE OR FLAMEOUT r. EXTERNAL STORES ABOARD A/C

s. FUEL CONTROL REGULATOR/CARBURETOR (List Stock and Off. Ref., give TIME SINCE REF. OF OVERHAUL)

(If additional space is necessary, attach additional sheet(s))

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT

PART II - MAINTENANCE, MATERIAL AND FACILITIES DATA (Cont'd)

- | | | |
|--|--|--|
| a. <input type="checkbox"/> CLEARANCE AUTHORITY | b. <input type="checkbox"/> RUNWAY | c. <input type="checkbox"/> EMERGENCY ARRESTING GEAR (Runway) |
| d. <input type="checkbox"/> FLIGHT PLANNING INFORMATION SOURCE | e. <input type="checkbox"/> WATER LANDING AREA | f. <input type="checkbox"/> AIRCRAFT SERVICING, HANDLING AND DIRECTING (FIELD OR SHIP) |
| g. <input type="checkbox"/> LANDING AIDS (GCA, COA, ILS, etc) | j. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> APPROACH ZONE | g. <input type="checkbox"/> CRASH AND RESCUE |
| d. <input type="checkbox"/> TRAFFIC CONTROL TOWER (Field or Ship) | k. <input type="checkbox"/> END ZONE | i. <input type="checkbox"/> SEARCH AND RESCUE |
| e. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> APPROACH AND ENROUTE AIDS TO NAVIGATION | l. <input type="checkbox"/> SHOULDER | m. <input type="checkbox"/> CATAPOULT |
| f. <input type="checkbox"/> RUNWAY WATCH | m. <input type="checkbox"/> TAXIWAY | n. <input type="checkbox"/> ARRESTING GEAR (Carrier) |
| g. <input type="checkbox"/> LANDING SIGNAL OFFICER | n. <input type="checkbox"/> PARKING AREA | o. <input type="checkbox"/> BARRIER OR BARBECAGE (FIELD OR SHIP) |
| q. <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER (Specify) | | p. <input type="checkbox"/> FLIGHT DECK |

8. EQUIPMENT INVOLVED	<input type="checkbox"/> CATAPOULT	<input type="checkbox"/> ARRESTING GEAR	FREQUENCY SETTINGS	9. KING OVER DECK	10. RELATIVE POSITION	11. APPROX SPEED (KTS OR KM/H)
f. MARK NUMBER	g. MODEL NUMBER	h. LOCATION ON SHIP				

12. CATAPOULT/ARRESTING GEAR WIRELETS OR SOMIGRAMS USED

k. This portion shall be completed whenever (1) a major aircraft accident involves arresting gear, barrier and/or barricade equipment, or (2) an aircraft accident involves malfunctioning of arresting gear, barrier and/or barricade equipment. Minor accidents or routine damage to cables, winches and other reportable components need not be reported.

ENGAGED	DECK RUNOUT (FT.)	RAM TRAVEL (IN.)	CONTROL VALVE SETTINGS			ACCUMU- LATOR PRES- SURE (PSI)	COMMENTS (for cable failures specify number of landings and months in service)
			CONSTANT PRESSURE RATE (PSI)	RATIO	CONSTANT RUN- OUT (WT. LBS.)		
DECK PENDANT							
DECK PENDANT							
BARRIER							
BARRIER							
BARRICADE							

PART III REMARKS (continue on separate pages if necessary)

Enclosures continued
9. Aircraft crash and fire report (NAVARIR 232D)
10. Medical Officers Report (OPNAV Form 3750-B)

Copies to:

Aviation Safety Center (2) Air Mail
Bureau of Aerospace (Aer 512) (1)
COMATRFAC (1)
CINCPACFLT (1)
BAR Columbus (1)

6

PART IV - SIGNATURES (INDICATE DATE SUBMITTED TO C.O.) 11/9/56

(b) (6)

Operations Officer

(senior member)

UNIT BILLET

(b) (6)

(Flight Surgeon member)

Maintenance Officer

UNIT BILLET

Safety Officer

UNIT BILLET

(member)

Part V The Accident

At 0714 on 29 October 1956 Ensign C. R. SCHMOOK made an individual take off on Runway 24R in FJ-3 BuNo. 136146 and entered downwind into FCLP pattern on Runway 24L. At the 180° position, Ensign SCHMOOK made the required radio call giving his modek, pilot's name and gear down check. At the 90° position he was observed at the proper altitude, however in an attitude flatter than normal for proper FCLP speed. The aircraft commenced to lose altitude and became low at the 30° position. The aircraft was observed to assume a high angle of attack and apparent loss of stability, both lateral and longitudinal. The port wing dropped low and the wingtip struck the top of the boundary fence of NAS Miramar (Photo #1). Continuing in the same wing down attitude the wingtip struck the ground 36 feet beyond the fence, dragging along the ground for 60 feet (Photo #2). The wing then bounced or was brought up and no part of the aircraft touched the ground for next 111 feet. The dragging wing swerved the aircraft to the left so that when the aircraft next hit the ground on the port main gear and nose gear it was traveling in a right skid with the longitudinal axis 40° left of the direction of travel (Photo #3). After 54 feet of travel on the port and nose gear, the starboard gear touched the ground (Photo #4). The aircraft continued in this manner for an additional 30 feet where the starboard wing and drop tank struck an automobile traveling on the perimeter road. (Photo #5). The force of the impact with the automobile and the immediate explosion tore the entire wing from the fuselage, and caused the fuselage to make a complete roll to the right. The impact with the automobile also deflected the fuselage and wing 20° left from the direction of travel at the time of impact. The fuselage continued for 539 feet

after striking the automobile. While inverted during the roll, the canopy and top of the ejection seat were torn from the fuselage (Photo #6). At this time the pilot received fatal injuries.

Part VI Damage to the Aircraft.

FJ-3H BUNO. 136146 sustained strike damage. Initial contact occurred when the port wing tip struck the boundary fence at NAS Miramar. Slight damage to the fence indicates that superficial damage was sustained by initial contact. The port wing received substantial damage when, thirty-six (36) feet west of the fence, it struck the ground, dragging the wing tip for 60 feet. The aircraft cocked 40° to port in relation to the direction of travel due to the drag induced by the port wing tip making contact with the ground. The degree of damage sustained by the main landing gear during this phase is undetermined, however, the main landing gear was still intact, and the nose gear was collapsing when the aircraft struck an automobile 280 feet west of the boundary fence. The vertical stabilizer was sheared off when contact was made with telephone cables 12 feet 9 inches above the ground. It is estimated the vertical stabilizer struck the telephone cables at the same time the starboard wing and drop tank struck the automobile at an estimated airspeed of 115 knots. Impact with the automobile caused immediate explosion and fire. The entire wing assembly, starboard gear and starboard drop tank separated from the fuselage upon impact. The fuselage and wing assembly veered 20° to the port after striking the automobile. The fuselage made one complete roll following the impact; in the inverted position the canopy, ejection seat and cockpit made violent contact with the ground demolishing the canopy, tearing off the top of the ejection seat and causing fatal injury to the pilot.

The fuselage skidded and bounced an additional 539 feet following impact with the automobile and during this travel the following major components were torn from the aircraft; horizontal stabilizer and the remaining parts of the empennage, barrier pickup, starboard speed brake, canopy and nose gear. Enclosure (7) the wreckage diagram and Photos 7 & 8 indicates the final position of all recognizable parts. The wing assembly continued in the same direction as the fuselage and came to rest 395 feet from the point of impact with the automobile. At time of impact with the automobile the engine was turning at or near maximum RPM and it sustained major damage from the dirt, stones and other debris inducted at this time. Salvage or repair of any components of the aircraft is not considered feasible due to the extensive damage caused by fire.

Part VII The Investigation

The investigation of the accident revealed the following facts:

- (a) ENS SCHMOOK was designated a naval aviator on 12 March 1956.
- (b) ENS SCHMOOK had a total of 510.8 pilot hours, 252.9 Jet Hours, 130.9 Hours in the FJ-3. All FJ-3 hours were received in FITRON FIVE ONE.
- (c) ENS SCHMOOK had completed 50 FCLP passes in the FJ-3 in the last four weeks. He completed his last FCLP period three days prior to the accident.
- (d) ENS SCHMOOK's flight records indicate he was an average student while undergoing flight training with no accidents during this period. He was considered an average pilot while attached to this command.
- (e) ENS SCHMOOK exhibited good technique in flying his previous FCLP patterns with no serious discrepancies.

(f) ENS SCHMOOK received 8 hours sleep the night prior to the accident and was considered to be in good physical and mental condition for this flight.

(g) ENS SCHMOOK was making his first FCLP pass of the period when the accident occurred. Facts pertaining to this flight on 29 October 1956:

(1) There was two-tenths cloud cover at 3000 feet, visibility was 15 * miles.

(2) The first deviation from the approved FCLP pattern was when the aircraft was observed to be too close aboard the FCLP runway at the 180° position.

(3) The testimony of witnesses reveals that the aircraft entered a stall at the 30° position and continued losing altitude until a complete stall was encountered as the aircraft attempted to clear a fence at the field boundary.

(4) The aircraft engine was operating normally throughout the flight and was operating at high RPM at the time of impact with the ground. The pilot was operating in the primary fuel system.

(5) The investigation revealed no engine malfunction however the engine fuel control was released to the contractor for priority disassembly and inspection as a double check on this point.

(6) The possibility of a flight control malfunction was discounted as all of the flight control actuators operated normally after removal from the aircraft.

(7) The fire that occurred during the accident was the result of an instantaneous explosion when the aircraft struck the automobile.

(h) The aircraft history reveals no past or present discrepancies that would have a bearing on this accident. Corrective action had been taken on all discrepancies. The aircraft logs were in good order.

(1) The impact that caused damage to the canopy and ejection seat caused the automatic seat belt initiator to fire. The accident would have been fatal to the pilot regardless of the fact that the seat belt fired.

Part VIII The Analysis

This major accident resulted from a compounding of a number of minor errors. The pilot's first error was in establishing a downwind leg too close aboard the FCLP runway (Photo #9). This close position was further aggravated by a quartering cross wind which necessitated an even greater degree of bank than would normally be required to make the runway from the close aboard 180° position. In addition having just taken off the aircraft was near the upper allowable weight limitations for FCLP landings. The pilot probably realized these factors in part and maintained a slight margin of airspeed through the turn to the 90° position. Spurred by pride, overconfidence in himself and his aircraft he attempted to salvage a tight slightly fast approach rather than applying power and going around. He reduced power considerably below the squadron minimum, 78% at any time in the FCLP approach, in order to reduce both altitude and airspeed. When the aircraft reached the proper altitude at the 30° position, the angle of attack was increased in order to hold this altitude and power application was delayed in order to slow the aircraft. By the time the throttle was advanced and necessary thrust obtained the aircraft was on the back side of the power curve. Lacking sufficient altitude to drop the nose and recover from this condition, the pilot relied upon the excellent control characteristics of the FJ aircraft during stall to keep the aircraft in a close to normal attitude as it stalled toward the ground. When collision with the

boundary fence at NAS Miramar was imminent, the pilot further increased the angle of attack in an attempt to clear the fence. This aggravated the stall condition and caused the port wing to drop sharply and strike the top of the fence. The aircraft then continued in a left wing down attitude and struck the ground. The wing then bounced or was brought back up by pilot control and the aircraft remained airborne for 111 feet before hitting the ground in a right skid with the longitudinal axis 40° from the direction of travel. Power was at or near 100% throughout this period and deceleration was negligible. The aircraft skidded for 84 feet on the landing gear and although the nose gear was collapsing and other major damage would have been suffered by the aircraft it is believed the pilots chances of emerging with minor injuries were excellent if the aircraft had not struck the automobile. Impact with the automobile tore the entire wing section from the fuselage and caused immediate explosion and fire. The fire obscured the wreckage from witnesses during the remainder of its travel. The damage to the fuselage indicates that it made one roll to starboard as it traveled 539 feet after striking the automobile, and came to rest with the cockpit up. Other major components were spread along between the point of impact with the automobile and the final resting place of the fuselage as shown in Enclosure (6) & (7). During the roll of the fuselage the canopy and top of the ejection seat were torn from the fuselage (Photo #6). It was at this time that the pilot received fatal injuries. Although the remaining portion of the seat did not travel beyond its upper limit it was bent to the extent that it caused the seat belt initiator to actuate, releasing the pilot's seat belt and shoulder harness. Although this had no bearing upon the injuries to the pilot in this particular accident it does point out the necessity

of expediting the availability of parts in order to install FJ aircraft service change 275-2. This aircraft service change might possibly prevent the seat belt and shoulder harness from releasing at a time when it could prevent or reduce injury to the pilot. FJ-3 ASC 275-2 was not installed in this aircraft in accordance with COMAIRPAC message 290101Z of August 1956. The change was not accomplished as the required parts were not and are still not available through the supply system. All other personal safety equipment functioned properly. The pilot's helmet was destroyed; however, the same impact was of such violence as to destroy the canopy, top of the ejection seat and armor plate. The fact that the aircraft struck an automobile is considered an isolated case and the installation of warning signs or traffic control on the perimeter road is not considered necessary due to it's distance of 3500 feet from the end of the runway. In addition the frequency of landings at NAS Miramar would make traffic control virtually impossible.

Part IX Conclusions and Recommendations.

a. Conclusions

(1) Pilot error is considered to be the primary cause of the accident, in that the pilot allowed the aircraft to enter a stalled condition without sufficient altitude to effect a safe recovery.

(2) The pilot had a total of 50 FCIP passes prior to the accident. On this approach he became low and slow with the power below the squadron minimum of 78% RPM for FCIP approach. In attempting to maintain altitude, the pilot increased the angle of attack beyond optimum limits placing the aircraft on the back side of the power curve. Power was added too late for a positive recovery and the aircraft stalled.

(4) It is concluded that pride and keen competitive spirit are

necessary in the makeup of a successful fighter pilot; however, this spirit must be tempered with respect for the aircraft and the realization of the pilot's capabilities. While each pilot must learn to obtain maximum performance available for himself and his aircraft, it is mandatory that flight safety remains paramount, and that limitations imposed in the interest of safety be strictly adhered to by all pilots.

b* Recommendations

(1) It is recommended that continued emphasis be placed on the stalling characteristics of swept wing aircraft, the relatively slow acceleration of jet engines from reduced power settings and the close adherence to the operating limitations prescribed in the interest of safety.

(2) It is recommended that all pilots review at frequent intervals the slow flight and stall characteristics of their particular aircraft. The effect of increased angles of bank on stalling speeds, and the lack of altitude and airspeed control when on the back side of the power curve should be particularly noted.

I first noticed the aircraft when it was some distance East of highway 395. I was traveling North on the Miramar road adjacent to highway 395. I had just casually noted prior to this that the plane appeared to be in somewhat of a flat altitude, slowly losing altitude. When it reached the altitude I would normally expect an aircraft to maintain over highway 395 during FCLF he still appeared flat and continued to lose altitude. I definitely sensed trouble while he was still well East of highway 395. As he approached 395 he was very low and assumed a rather high angle of attack. I could not determine whether or not he had ever until he approached 395. At this time however, he was very low, very cocked up and had what sounded like full power. Lateral stability was very poor. This condition was very noticeable for the last 50 ft. or so. The aircraft gave the appearance of frenetically struggling to maintain altitude but unable to do so; and quite unstable at the same time. The port wing tip was the first part to come in contact with the ground as it dipped fairly violently. This initial contact was virtually right in front of my automobile about 20 to 30 yards East of the Miramar road. The aircraft then continued straight on West, fire breaking out immediately especially as it collided with the automobile directly in front of me. I did not see the plane strike the car and did not know it had even hit the car until later. I could see the front and port side, but not the starboard side. I ran to where the fuselage came to rest and saw I could be of no aid to the pilot. Shortly thereafter the crash crew arrived on the scene.

(b) (6)

LTC USNR

15

COMMENT ON LTJG [REDACTED] CREDIBILITY AS A FITNESS BOARD MEMBER

LTJG [REDACTED] (b) (6) is a naval aviator with 650 total hours, and approximately 9 hours in the FJ aircraft. He is carrier qualified although not in jet aircraft. He has natural interest in FOLP and has often stopped to observe aircraft making FOLP approaches. In view of LTJG [REDACTED] (b) (6) aviation experience, his excellent point of observation and impartiality he is considered an excellent expert eye witness.

Page two of two pages.

STATEMENT OF WITNESS CONCERNING FATAL ACCIDENT INVOLVING FJ-3M BUNO 136146.

At approximately 0725 on 29 October, 1956 I was in FJ-3M Buno 135226 following FJ-3M Buno 136146 on his first PGLP approach. 136146 turned downwind ahead of me after taking off on 27R. I turned downwind behind 136146, but had too close an interval. As he approached the 180° position I assumed I would be able to make my approach as he was far too close aboard the runway, especially considering the crosswind, and would overshoot and have to go around.

At the 30° position he appeared low and his port wing dropped sharply to approximately 40° angle of bank then rotated quickly to a near wings level position. From my position it did not appear that the wing had struck the ground or fence. The aircraft then struck the ground in what appeared to be level condition and burst into flames almost immediately. I could not see that he had struck a wire. The aircraft had not stopped when it impacted below the nose of my aircraft.

(b) (6)

LTCG USNR

COMMENT ON CREDIBILITY OF LTJC VAN DYKE AS A WITNESS BY AAC BOARD.

LTJC (b) (6) is a naval aviator with 850 total hours of which 400 are FJ-3 hours. He is considered an expert eye witness.

ENCLOSURE (2).

STATEMENT OF WHEELS [REDACTED] CONCERNING FATAL ACCIDENT INVOLVING FJ-3M BUNO 136146.

When I first saw the plane he was starting to make his turn at the same altitude as other planes do. His landing gear was down when I looked at him through the binoculars. When I saw him again, he was low, so I looked through the binoculars and his nose was up, and he was sort of wobbling. I tried to look at him without the glasses, and I couldn't see him very good, so when I next saw him through the glasses his wing hit the ground and he dragged like that for a while and then his plane hit the ground and started burning.

(b) (6) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] AD1, USN.

STATEMENT OF CREDIBILITY OF [REDACTED] AD1 AS A WITNESS BY AIR BOARD.

(b) (6) [REDACTED] has been serving as the NAS Miramar wheels watch for one week prior to the accident. He is considered an excellent eye witness.

ENCLOSURE (3).

STATEMENT OF L.S.O. CONCERNING FATAL ACCIDENT INVOLVING FJ-3M BU NO 136146.

On or about 0720, 29 October 1956 I was conducting Field Carrier Landing Practice at N.A.S., Miramar. The wind was from the south SE at 5-8 knots, visibility unlimited.

ENS SCHMOOK was flying his first period of field Carrier Landing Practice. He had demonstrated excellent landing technique on his previous period of 26 October 1956, he flew an approach speed of 135. SCHMOOK had flown a total of 50 passes and my records show him flying very slow (about 122 knots) only 3 times and slightly low out of turn 8 times with no dangerous tendencies noted.

LTJO (b) (6) Assistant L.S.O. undergoing training, was waving, while I was backing him up on the radio. LTJO (b) (6) has observed at least one (1) thousand approaches and has waved 334 approaches.

ENS SCHMOOK was late getting into the FCLP pattern. He entered the pattern down-wind and called paddles at the 180° position. His altitude was about 200' and the attitude of the airplane indicated good speed (130/135 knots). His distance abeam appeared to be slightly close. I wrote the plane number and pilot name in my book and again watched the airplane. At the 90° position the altitude was good and attitude in the turn appeared to be acceptable. Approaching the 45° position the aircraft began to lose altitude. I could not hear the power. I picked up the radio handset to wave him off and LTJO (b) (6) shouted "Wave off, Wave off" and waved him off with the paddles. I waved him off by radio, simultaneously the airplane rolled sharply left wing down about 20° then rolled right wing down 20-25° settling rapidly. The airplane had a normal to slightly high angle of attack when the left wing dropped again about 30° and struck the ground. The plane seemed to be rolling on its main landing gear for an instant and headed in straight line, then it exploded and veered left.

Page one of two pages.
ENCLOSURE (4).

Later I learned that an automobile was involved, however, I did not see the car or the collision with the vehicle.

The crash crew stationed between runway 24L and runway 28 was slow to get to the scene. LTJG (b) (6) fired the Very pistol to attract their attention and they took at least three minutes to get to the crash.

In my opinion this accident could have been prevented had the pilot maintained sufficient airspeed. I cannot say whether the accident was caused by a power failure or insufficient power applied by the pilot to maintain altitude and airspeed. It cannot be over-emphasized that the pilot must fly his own airplane until the plane is relatively close, the L.S.O. can only detect the obvious changes in altitude and attitude. When the airplane is at the 45° and beyond, the L.S.O. cannot tell how much power the pilot is using until the airplane shows it to him with a relatively large change in attitude and/or altitude. The pilot must match power to his attitude to maintain altitude and the desired airspeed. Knowledge of the power-on stall speed, the power-off stall speed and the stall speed relative to the angle of bank, all of which depend on the particular gross weight of the aircraft, must be second nature to the pilot; to know it once is not enough-the pilot must be repeatedly exposed to these facts:

POWER + ATTITUDE = PERFORMANCE

(b) (6)

LTJG USNR
Carrier Air Group Five
Landing Signal Officer

COMMENT ON CREDIBILITY OF LTJG (b) (6) AS WITNESS BY AIR BOARD.

LTJG (b) (6) is the senior Air Group Five LSO. He has 36 months continuous duty as a LSO and 14 months experience with FJ type aircraft. He is a naval aviator with 850 total hours and 100 hours in the FJ aircraft. He is considered an expert eye witness.

STATEMENT OF ASSISTANT LSO CONCERNING FATAL ACCIDENT INVOLVING FJ-3M BUNO 136146

On the morning of 29 October, 1956 I was the VF-141 assistant LSO winging VF-51 aircraft under the close supervision of the CVG 5 senior LSO, LTJG J. D. WOLF.

INSIGN SCHMOOK, flying VF-3 Madox No. 105 Buno 136146, was making his first paddles pass for this mission period. He appeared to have the aircraft well under control at the 180° position, going slightly low at the 45° position, but remaining within elevators and rudder tolerances.

The aircraft then began to wobble about its longitudinal axis but appeared to remain in a relatively flat attitude. I was not holding and working the aircraft on paddles at this time. I began to wave the pilot off by using the paddles and yelling at the same time to LTJG (b) (6) for a voice waveoff. He immediately replied with 3 or 4 low and definite voice waveoffs which were followed by 2 or 3 voice crash reports. No voice transmissions were received from INSIGN SCHMOOK after his call at the 180° position.

During the first part of LTJG (b) (6) voice transmissions the aircraft continued to turn in towards the runway heading of 240° magnetic. The aircraft continued to wobble about the longitudinal axis but remained in a flat attitude relative to the lateral axis and the aircraft's relative wind. As the aircraft approached the field boundary it established its first nose high position (not excessive) with the port wing dropping sharply. This was the last airborne attitude that I saw this aircraft in. The port wing then struck the ground with the aircraft approaching a more level attitude which appeared to be favorable. The aircraft then exploded and burned. During this particular maneuver the aircraft did not appear, by vision or sound, to have sufficient engine power and if the engine did respond to the necessary full throttle wave off it did not develop enough thrust soon enough to counteract the sink rate.

Page one of two pages.

ENCLOSURE (5).

20

The crash truck and crew stationed near paddles did not immediately depart for the scene of the accident. I fired the very pistol at the crash crew to further alert them of the accident.


(b) (6)

LTJG USNR

CONTINUE ON CREDIBILITY OF LTJG [REDACTED] AS A WITNESS BY THE AIR BOARD.


* LTJG (b) (6) is an Air Group Five assistant LSO under training. He has observed at least one thousand FOLP approaches and has waved 394 approaches. He is a naval aviator with 800 total hours. He is considered an expert eye witness.

Page two of two pages.
ENCLOSURE (5).



22

HWY. 395 ////////////////



NHS MIRAMAR ACCESS ROAD

LOCAL FLIGHT PLAN
LIND Form 2341 (Rev. 6-52)

ETD 0715 DURATION OF FLIGHT 0145 DATE 10-11-56 AIRCRAFT TYPE F5-3

PILOTS	BU. NO./MODEX	PILOTS	BU. NO./MODEX
FLIGHT LEADER <u>(b) (6)</u>	<u>101</u> <u>102</u> <u>103</u>	<u>(b) (6)</u>	<u>104</u> <u>105</u>

DESTINATION (Indicate Mission, Area, Route)
KOCHI

FUEL IN HOURS 2+30 WEIGHT & BALANCE (Form) 07R RADIO GUARD FREQ. WLC 1044 FRS ETA 0800
(Date) 10-11-56 (Where Fired) (initial)

I certify that I have been briefed on weather conditions along the route and at the destination and that no portion of this flight will be conducted on other than visual Flight Rules.

SIGNATURE (b) (6) ACTIVITY VF-31
SIGNATURE (b) (6) on application

Navy--OPPO 1 (HD, San Diego, Calif.)

24

ENCLOSURE (8)

AIRCRAFT CRASH FIRE REPORT

To be made out immediately after arrival at the scene of the accident or as soon as practicable.

13-160	13-160	13-160	13-160	13-160	13-160	13-160
10/29/56	0725	10/29/56	0725	10/29/56	0725	10/29/56
Cloudy (C)		Cloudy (C)		Cloudy (C)		Cloudy (C)
0725	0725	0725	0725	0725	0725	0725
13-1	71-0506	4	4-C	Foam	10,000 gal	ea
13-1	71-0521	5	4-C, 1-C	Foam	10,000 gal	ea
13-2	71-0674	2	2-C, 1-C	Foam	100 gal	ea
PT-3	72-0425	5	4-C, 1-C	Foam	300 gal	ea
PT-4	72-0419	0	1-M	Foam & CO ₂	100-500 lbs, 100-150 gal	ea
Crange (MB-2)	45-07309	1	1-M			ea
Ambulance	92-0651	1	1-M			ea
Packup						ea

AIRCRAFT CRASH FIRE REPORT

10/29/56

10/29/56

10/29/56

10/29/56

Complete demolition of aircraft and
private vehicle

Burning of wreckage

25

0725-Crash alarm sounded reporting aircraft crash 1/2 mile east of runway 24-R.
Crash equipment listed above responded immediately.

0727-On arrival at scene of crash found parts of aircraft and automobile strewn over an area of approximately 100 yards with most of debris burning. Crash equipment concentrated on extinguishing fire in fuselage, accomplishing same using foam and CO₂. Body of pilot removed from cockpit by crash crew personnel. Secondary fires extinguished by crash personnel using foam and water. Investigation showed that automobile with two occupants traveling north on road at right angles to approach of runway was struck by aircraft on RCL.

ENCLOSURE (9) 

Aircraft making approach to field apparently had a power failure causing wing to strike boundary fence, then a telephone cable, and striking off on road approximately 3,000 feet short of head of runway 24-R. Bodies of the two occupants of automobile were found 150 yards from point of impact.

(390)-Fixes out. (390)-outcomes, -outcomes,

NOTE: GRC 6 x 6 brush truck from Structural Fire Station used to extinguish molten iron in class "A" material in debris and to wash down foam from fuselage wreckage, apparatus 75-0086, 1 civilian operator.

PHOTOGRAPHIC ATTACHMENTS.

XXXXXXOOXXXXXXX 11297
XXXXXKXXXXXXX
XXXXXAXXXXXX
XXXXXAXXXXXX

x-148 bua-k (5)-743
Via: COMMANS 11/228
Copy to: BIRRAVAYA/PLUR

Y. D. MIRSKY, 1977-1978

(b) (6)

20

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

1. This report shall be filed in the event of an aircraft accident/incident which involves one or more of the following:
 - Death
 - Injury
 - Ditching
 - Water Crash
 - Hard-out of Ejection (attempted or successful).
 - Wherever physiological or psychological factors are involved.
 - Aircraft Ground Accidents resulting in serious injury to personnel.
 - Conspicuity of the form shall be the responsibility of the flight surgeon.
 - For type accident and damage code refer to OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6A.
 - This form shall be prepared in triplicate. One copy shall be turned over to the Aircraft Accident Board for the survival and

Intelligence Officer in the case of combat incidents), and the original shall be air mailed regular mail within 720 miles of Washington, D.C.) direct to Chief of Naval Operations (OP-57) Navy Department, Washington 25, D.C. within 4 working days following the accident. The third copy shall be mailed direct to Safety Equipment Branch, BUADB, Navy Department, Washington 25, D.C. The fourth copy shall be forwarded direct via air mail (regular mail within 350 miles of Norfolk, Va.) to the U.S. Naval Aviation Safety Activity, Naval Air Station, Norfolk 11, Virginia. Where more than one aircraft is involved, separate forms must be completed for each aircraft wherein one or more of the requirements in paragraph 1, above are applicable. (Additional copies may be prepared for use of squadron flight surgeons and other interested individuals)

1. FROM (skip or station address):	VF-51	2. SERIAL NO.:	4-56	3. ACCIDENT LOCATION (geographic location):	3500 ft. east of end of runway	4. TIME (local):	0723	5. DATE:	10-29-56
6. PLANE MODEL:	McDonnell FJ-3	7. OTHER MODELS:	136146	8. NO. INCIDENTS:	1	9. UNIT OPERATING AIRCRAFT:	VF-51	10. TYPE INCIDENT:	D-1
11. PLANE (if involved):		12. NO. INCIDENTS:		13. UNIT OPERATING AIRCRAFT:		14. DAMAGE:		15. CARGO:	

6. NAME OF PILOT IN CONTROL OF AIRCRAFT AT TIME OF ACCIDENT/INCIDENT: SCHNOOK, Charles Robert

1. FLIGHT SURGEON CHECK LIST:	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ALL PARTS OF FORM COMPLETED	2. SURVIVORS NARRATIVES:	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PHOTOS AS NEEDED	3. RECOMMENDATIONS:	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> COPIES FURNISHED
4. REPORT FILED BY:	(b) (6)	5. PILOT SIGNATURE:	(b) (6)	6. DATE:	11-8-56
7. PILOTS SIGNATURE:	(b) (6)	8. CO-PILOT SIGNATURE:	(b) (6)	9. DATE:	11-8-56
10. AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT	11. AIRCRAFT INCIDENT	12. COMBAT INCIDENT	13. GROUND INCIDENT		

14. ACCIDENT DESCRIPTION
INCLUDE HEREAFTER PARSGRAPH DIVIDING A BRIEF BUT FAIRLY ACCURATE DESCRIPTION OF THE ACCIDENT/INCIDENT. INSTANCE YOUR FAIRNESS AS KNOWN, ESTIMATE OF TIME, FORCES, APPROX. OF IMPACT, SPEED ON IMPACT, ATTITUDE IN IMPACT, ETC. ATTACH PHOTOGRAPH WHEN PERTINENT.

27

14. PILOT FACTORS (Check pertinent before factors listed below)

PILOT	CO-PILOT	PILOT	CO-PILOT
IN CONTROL AT TIME OF ACCIDENT/INCIDENT		HYPOKIA SUSPECTED	No
AMOUNT OF FLIGHT TIME IN LAST 24 HOURS	.15	CARBON MONOXIDE POISONING SUSPECTED	No
NUMBER OF FLIGHTS IN LAST 24 HOURS	1.65	FAULTY VISION	No
NUMBER HOURS DUTY IN LAST 24 HOURS	The	AEROBIOLOGISM	No
HOURS SINCE LAST FULL MEAL	None	BLACKOUT, GREYOUT, REDOUT	No
TIME AT CONTROLS THIS FLIGHT	One	VERTIGO	No
TOTAL FLIGHT TIME	.15	NIGHT BLINDNESS	No
TOTAL FLIGHT TIME IN MODEL	510.8	FATIGUE	No
NUMBER PREVIOUS ACCIDENTS	130.9	DOMESTIC DIFFICULTIES	No
DATE OF LAST ACCIDENT	None	UNFAMILIARITY IN TYPE AIRCRAFT	No
NUMBER DAYS GROUNDED IN LAST MONTH	None	ANXIETY REACTION	No
DATE LAST LOW PRESSURE INDOTRIFICATION	None	LAST CER (date and score)	9-2-55 4/4
AMOUNT SLEEP IN LAST 24 HOURS	8 hrs.	OTHER PERTINENT FACTORS IN ACCIDENT (describe below)	None

15. COMMENTS ON ITEMS CHECKED UNDER ITEM 14 WHICH ARE PERTINENT TO ACCIDENT/INCIDENT. WHERE APPLICABLE, COMMENT BELOW IN ANY OF THE ABOVE FACTORS AFFECTING CHECK

SUMMARIES OF SAFETY EQUIPMENT, INJURIES AND CAUSE

DIRECTIONS

1. Use separate form for each person.
2. Under Injury Class, use following key:

Class "A" Fatal injury, is considered for reporting procedure as one that results in death prior to submission of the Aircraft Accident Report.
Class "B" Critical injury is considered for reporting procedure as injury which threatens to result in death either from injuries sustained in the accident or from complications thereof. Critical injuries resulting in death within 30 days shall be reported by letter to the original addresser.
Class "C" Serious injury is considered for reporting procedure as injury less than critical, but definitely requiring five or more days hospitalization involving medical treatment but from which the individual will be expected to recover. Unreported critical conditions or complications economically

listed in this category which result in death within 30 days shall be reported by letter to the original addresser.
Class "D" Minor injury is considered for reporting procedure as any injury less than serious.
Class "E" No injury.
Class "F" Unknown injury - lost and presumed drowned.
Class "G" Unknown injury - missing.
Injuries reported, use following key:
"U" Unconscious
"P" Paralyzed
"T" Treated and returned to duty
"H" Hospitalized
"R" Remaining recovered
"N" Resulting not recovered

1. NAME	2. FILE NO.			3. RANK/RATE	4. AGE	5. WEIGHT	6. HEIGHT							
SCHMOOK, Charles Robert	504727			ENS	22	135	68"							
7. DUTY ABOARD PLANE, ON DECK/GROUND	8. POSITION OCCUPIED AT TIME OF ACCIDENT			9. INJURY CLASS		10. DISPOSITION								
Pilot	Cockpit			"A"		"T"								
11. SAFETY EQUIPMENT	MODEL/TYPE	AVAILABLE	USED	NOT USED	DAMAGED	LOST	RAS OXYGEN BEING USED							
SHOULDER HARNESS	FJ-3	X	X		X		AT TIME OF ACCIDENT <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO							
LAP BELT	FJ-3	X	X		X		PRE-OXYGENATION <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO							
INERTIA REEL	FJ-3	X	X				IF YES, OXYGEN SUPPLY PRESSURE PRIOR TO FLIGHT <input type="checkbox"/> 1500							
"G" SUIT	Z-2	X	X		X		AT TIME OF ACCIDENT <input type="checkbox"/> Unknown <input type="checkbox"/> 1500 PSI							
HELMET	AFH-2H	X	X		X		RAS OXYGEN EQUIPMENT <input type="checkbox"/> Unknown <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO							
OXYGEN MASK	A-13-A	X	X		X		PRE-FLIGHTED BY PILOT <input type="checkbox"/> Unknown <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO							
GOGGLES							IF SHOULDER HARNESS USED <input type="checkbox"/> LOCKED <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> UNLOCKED <input type="checkbox"/> TIGHT <input type="checkbox"/> SLACK							
SHOES (type)	Flt Issue	X	X				<input type="checkbox"/> PRESSED FORWARD AGAINST HARNESS <input type="checkbox"/> PRESSED AGAINST SEAT BACK							
FLIGHT SUIT, OTHER THAN "G" (type)	Summer	X	X		X									
EXPOSURE SUIT (type)														
OTHER (specify)														
12. COMMENT ON EFFECTIVENESS (Entries of "Not," "None," "as designed," etc., will not be accepted. If any equipment failed, describe failure and probable cause). Use additional sheet if necessary.														
13. See Enclosure														
IN CASE OF BURNS, FREEZING, OR FROSTBITE LIST ALL CLOTHING WORN. USE ADDITIONAL SHEET IF NECESSARY.														
14. POST CRASH EXAMINATION														
IF DEAD, LIST PRIMARY CAUSE (multiple entries, if stated)				INTERNAL INJURIES										
(b) (6)				See Protocol of Autopsy										
AUTOPSY FINDINGS, IF PERFORMED				IF HOSPITALIZED, GIVE DIAGNOSIS										
See Enclosure				PLACE										
ESTIMATED LENGTH OF HOSPITALIZATION				LIST PRE-EXISTING PHYSICAL DEFECTS PRESENT AT TIME OF POST CRASH EXAMINATION (as condition permits)										
CARBON MONOXIDE-NAME, CONC TEST-RESULTS														
Not done				None										
IF GROUNDED, REASON				ESTIMATED LENGTH OF GROUNDED										
15. INJURIES														
Sea Post Mortem														
BURNS		DEGREE	1ST	2ND	3RD	1ST	2ND	3RD	CARBONIZATION ENTIRE BODY					
FROSTBITE		AREA	HEAD (central)	(dorsal)	TRUNK (ventral)	(dorsal)	EXTREMITIES (upper)	(lower)						
UNCONSCIOUSNESS		SHORT DURATION-LITTLE SIGNIFICANCE		OTHER (time)										
HEAD		CEREBRAL CONCUSSION		<input type="checkbox"/> MINOR	<input type="checkbox"/> SERIOUS	<input type="checkbox"/> CRITICAL	<input type="checkbox"/> FATAL	MINOR FACIAL INJURIES		MAJOR FACIAL INJURIES				
INJURIES		MINOR EYE INJURIES		<input type="checkbox"/> RIGHT EYE		<input type="checkbox"/> LEFT EYE		MAJOR EYE INJURIES		<input type="checkbox"/> RIGHT EYE	<input type="checkbox"/> LEFT EYE			
TYPE		SKULL	VERTEBRAE (specify no.)		SHOULDER	PEL.	UPPER ARM LOWER ARM	HAND	UPPER LEG LOWER LEG	FOOT				
BONES		CRANIAL	FACIAL	CERV.	THOR.	LUMBAR	SACRAL	COCCYX	GT	VIS	LEFTRIGHTELEFTRIGHTLEFTRIGHTLEFTRIGHTLEFTRIGHT			
SIMPLE														
FRACTURE														
COMPOUND														
FRACTURE														
COMMUNICATED														
FRACTURE														
DIS.		JAW							SHOULDER	ELBOW	WIST	HIP	KNEE	ANKLE
LO-											HAND		FOOT	
CA-														
TION														
AMPUTATIONS - STATE PARTS														
AREA OF INVOLVEMENT		LACERATIONS			CONTUSION/SPRAIN/STRAIN			ABRASIONS			DROWNING			
HEAD		MILD	MODERATE	SEVERE	MILD	MODERATE	SEVERE	MILD	MODERATE	SEVERE	SHOCK	EXPOSURE		
VENTRAL											<input type="checkbox"/> MILD	<input type="checkbox"/> MODERATE	<input type="checkbox"/> SEVERE	
DORSAL											<input type="checkbox"/> MILD	<input type="checkbox"/> MODERATE	<input type="checkbox"/> SEVERE	
NECK														
THORAX		VENTRAL												
DORSAL														
ABDOMEN		VENTRAL												
DORSAL														
EXTREMITIES (upper)														
EXTREMITIES (lower)														
16. CAUSE OF INJURIES (Give opinion as to cause of each injury indicated above. Give specific parts of aircraft involved. Entries of "No," "None," "Unsustained" or "Unknown," or "Undetermined" with no amplification will not be accepted. Use additional sheet, if necessary.)														

ADDENDUM to Medical Officers AAR #4-56 of Fighter Squadron 51

ENS. Charles R. SCHMOOK was the pilot of a FJ-3 aircraft which crashed and burned 3500 feet, East of the end of runway 24 L, NAS, MIRAMAR on 29 October 1956.

The pilot had first taken off and was coming around for his first pass of the period in the PCLP pattern. He had been airborne approximately nine (9) minutes. The aircraft was seen to be wrapped up and too close abeam at the 90° position. At this time the pilot was given vocal save off's by the LS0's, however these were apparently disregarded and the aircraft continued its approach.

The aircraft in a 30° left turn first hit the fence along Highway 395 with its port wing, breaking the running light there, but from the damage to the fence, this was practically an insignificant blow other than it aided putting the aircraft in a starboard skid. The aircraft then touched down in a 9° nose down, left wing down attitude at an estimated speed of 115 knots.

The aircraft touched down in a starboard skid and continued in said skid for approximately 300 feet where it hit an automobile which was at that time in the process of crossing beneath the final approach area to runway 24 L. This was an authorized road for station travel.

Upon impact with the automobile, the aircraft burst into flames, probably from rupture of its starboard drop tank. The aircraft continued forward and apparently rolled about the longitudinal axis of the aircraft once.

The automobile disintegrated on impact and both occupants, enlisted personnel of VF-122, were killed instantly.

As the aircraft rolled about the longitudinal axis of the aircraft, the cockpit section of the aircraft received severe blow which tore off the canopy, crushed the windshield, and tore off the top of the FJ-3 ejection seat. The severity of this force is attested to by the torn bent armor plating and ejection seat rails.

(b) (6)



After completing the roll, the aircraft fuselage, minus the wing section, righted itself and skidded to a stop. The entire wing section probably came off upon impact with the car and prior to the rolling of the fuselage and came to rest to the left and behind the fuselage section.

No amount of present survival equipment would have prevented the pilot from sustaining the injuries he sustained. The forces which caused the extensive damage to the ejection seat top and canopy section were extreme.

Because of the shearing action caused by the fuselage rolling to the right and the forward motion of the fuselage, the right side of the ejection seat was so bent as to cause the lap belt mechanism to fire.

The extension coupling to the firing mechanism of the lap belt (ie Service Change Number 275-2) had not been incorporated in the aircraft in compliance with COMAIRPAQ dispatch 290101Z of August 1956. This was not due to squadron failure to act, but due to the failure of the supply system to provide the required parts.

It is not felt that the firing of the lap belt mechanism contributed to the pilots injuries, however as mentioned in previous AAR's by this investigator, it could become quite important in other crash conditions.

The trunion bolt anchoring mechanism of the ejection seat was checked and found to have held well and showed no evidence of failure. The fixation of the seat to the floor of the cockpit in no way contributed to the firing of the lapbelt mechanism.

THE HARD HAT:

The hard hat was extensively damaged and shattered. There were numerous pieces found about the impact site. (See photo for largest piece).

THE OXYGEN MASK:

This was burned to the extent that only a ash contour remained. It is not felt that oxygen played any part in this accident.

THE PILOTS ACTIVITIES:

The pilot is known to have flown 1.5 hours the previous day with no difficulty. He retired at 2200 the night prior to the accident, and awoke at approximately 0600. He had no alcohol the PM prior to the the accident and had breakfast the following AM prior to the hop. No prior existing physical defects are noted which may have contributed to this accident.

The cause of the accident must be attributed to pilot error.

CONCLUSIONS:

1. Pilot error caused this accident.
2. No amount of protective equipment would have prevented the injuries sustained by the pilot as long as he occupied the cockpit of the aircraft.
3. (b) (5)

4. Mechanical: There are no apparent discrepancies which may have caused this accident

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Continued emphasis of the fact that if a pilot feels uncomfortable in his pass, he should wave off. It costs little to go around again.

FIRST POINT OF IMPACT
PORT WINGTIP HIT FENCE


PHOTO 1



ENCLOSURE (6)

FIRST IMPACT WITH GROUND
PORT WINGTIP DRAGGED 60 Ft.

PHOTO 2



ENCLOSURE (6)

VERT. STAB. HIT CABLE


33


PHOTO 3



STBD. GEAR JACK

ENCLOSURE (6) 4





TOP OF EJECTION SEAT
GROUND OFF

PH01, 6


36



HARNESS CUT BY
CORPSMAN

ENCLOSURE (6)

PHOTO 7







PHOTO 8

FLIGHT PATH OF AIRCRAFT

P HOTO 6



ENCL.

ENCLOSURE 6





